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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CAMPAIGN
TRAIL: WHEN POLITICAL ACTION BECOMES
STATE ACTION
LAUREN N. SMITH†
ABSTRACT
Constitutional law often splits society into two realms: public and
private. A person’s constitutional rights and obligations depend on her
classification into one of these realms. Almost all constitutional rights
are only protected against encroachment by the state, and thus whether
an action constitutes private or state action is incredibly significant.
However, the body of law that governs this determination—the state
action doctrine—is notoriously muddled.
The longstanding assumption is that political candidates and their
campaigns are private actors, though the Court has on occasion, such
as in the “white primary” cases, held that action by political parties
constitutes state action. However, in recent years, the focus of
electioneering has shifted away from political parties, and the
democratic process has become far more candidate centric. At the same
time, actions that might violate the Constitution if they were carried out
by a state actor, such as the removal of protestors from campaign rallies
and the rescission of press credentials for campaign events, have
become widely publicized. In light of these developments, this Note
argues that it is time to consider whether a candidate’s actions should
now be considered state action for purposes of constitutional tort
claims. By combining elements from the Supreme Court’s many
formulations of the state action doctrine and invoking the logic behind
the cases in which the Court found state action by political parties, this
Note proposes a framework for assessing whether a candidate and her
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campaign’s conduct on the campaign trail should be considered state
action.

INTRODUCTION
“[T]he hardest thing about any political campaign is how to win
without proving that you are unworthy of winning.”
Adlai Stevenson I1

On March 1, 2016, from behind a podium with the American and
Kentucky flags hanging in the background, then-presidential candidate
Donald Trump repeatedly shouted, “Get ‘em outta here!”2 After
observing signs held by protestors Kashiya Nwanguma, Molly Shah,
and Henry Brousseau that depicted the candidate’s face on a pig’s
body, Trump ordered that the three be removed from his campaign
rally in Louisville, Kentucky.3 Members of the audience proceeded to
assault the protestors, shoving and punching them until they exited the
rally.4
Though not always ending in violence, the practice of removing
protestors from campaign events is not uncommon. Five months later,
at a Trump rally in Portland, Maine, a group of protestors stood
silently, pocket copies of the U.S. Constitution held above their heads.5
Trump again paused his speech as campaign staffers escorted the
protestors out of the building.6 This practice is also not unique to the
Trump campaign. On January 2, 2016, in Amherst, Massachusetts, a
man in a Trump shirt stood and shouted, “Shame on you, Bernie,” at

1. Richard Cavendish, Adlai Stevenson’s Second Run, HIST. TODAY (Aug. 8, 2006),
https://www.historytoday.com/archive/adlai-stevenson%E2%80%99s-second-run [https://perma.cc/
AC9S-ZQV2].
2. Lexington Herald Leader, Donald Trump Ousts Protesters in Louisville, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 1, 2016), https://youtu.be/vwMqf6Y7Md4 [https://web.archive.org/web/20201118001933if_/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vwMqf6Y7Md4].
3. Andrea Diaz, Trump Did Not Incite Violence Against Protesters at a 2016 Campaign
Rally, Court Rules, CNN (Sept. 12, 2018, 6:33 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/12/politics/
trump-wins-dismissal-lawsuit-kentucky-trnd [https://perma.cc/D6BX-6HCG].
4. Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604, 606–07 (6th Cir. 2018).
5. Jeremy Diamond, Protesters with Pocket Constitutions Removed from Trump Rally,
CNN (Aug. 4, 2016, 5:44 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/04/politics/donald-trump-protestsconstitution [https://perma.cc/B332-PUVE].
6. Will Drabold, Protestors at Donald Trump Rally Hold Up Pocket Constitutions, TIME
(Aug. 4, 2016, 4:12 PM), https://time.com/4439590/donald-trump-rally-pocket-constitutions
[https://perma.cc/9FTG-79HR].
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the campaign rally of presidential candidate Bernie Sanders.7 Sanders
supporters proceeded to “boo” the protestor as he was removed by
campaign staff in response to Sanders’s call, “Here is a Trump
supporter.”8
The silencing of protestors ought to call to mind the First
Amendment, which protects the right to speak freely and “attempt to
persuade others to change their views,” even though “the speaker’s
message may be offensive to his audience.”9 If this is true, one might
ask: Why have the protestors from these incidents not taken to the
courts to vindicate their First Amendment rights? Because the state
action doctrine, as it is currently understood, stands in the way.10
In Nwanguma v. Trump,11 the protestors removed from the
Kentucky rally actually did take to the courts, but not with a First
Amendment claim, likely presuming that the state action doctrine
would foreclose such an argument.12 Instead, they sued Trump for
injuries relating to the assault and battery committed by rally
attendees, and they alleged that Trump had incited a riot.13 Responding
to the complaint, Trump’s attorneys wrote in defense:

7. Dan Merica, Man Wearing Trump T-shirt Protests at Sanders Rally, CNN (Jan. 2,
2016, 6:20 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/02/politics/bernie-sanders-donald-trumpprotester [https://perma.cc/UY9Z-MLSW].
8. Id. Unlike the first example, the Sanders rally did not result in violence against the
protestors.
9. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. When removing protestors, political candidates and their campaigns are often assumed
to be private parties exercising their First Amendment right to control their message and remove
those with opposing views from events. See Benjamin Good, What We Learn When People Are
Kicked Out of Campaign Rallies, MEDIUM (Aug. 15, 2016), https://link.medium.com/
f5PqnrhmSab [https://perma.cc/UJE9-6Y5T] (“The First Amendment protects a campaign’s
ability to control its political message. That’s why political candidates generally have the right to
kick protesters out of campaign rallies.”); Lee Rowland & Rachel Goodman, Is It Okay To Kick
People Out of Campaign Rallies? That Depends., ACLU (Mar. 15, 2016, 3:15 PM), https://
www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/it-okay-kick-people-out-campaign-rallies-depends [https://perma
.cc/4TDY-HSFJ] (“Campaigns can opt to exclude protesters from campaign rallies. The First
Amendment doesn’t stop them—in fact, the First Amendment protects the campaign’s right to
control its message.”). This Note, however, would flip this assumption on its head.
11. Nwanguma v. Trump, 273 F. Supp. 3d 719 (W.D. Ky. 2017).
12. Complaint at 2, id. (No. 16-CV-247).
13. Id. at 14–18. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that because Trump’s statements were
“calculated to incite violence,” they were not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 15.
Although these protestors were able to file a tort claim for their physical and emotional injuries,
in other cases involving a political candidate, such as the Sanders example, tort remedies are not
available to vindicate the specific infringement of the protestors’ First Amendment right.
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Of course, protestors have their own First Amendment right to
express dissenting views, but they have no right to do so as part of the
campaign rally of the political candidates they oppose. Indeed,
forcing the “private organizers” of a political rally to accept everyone
“who wish[es] to join in with some expressive demonstration of their
own” would “violate[] the fundamental rule of protection under the
First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the
content of his own message.”14

Relying on the assumption that Trump was a private actor
throughout his presidential campaign, his attorneys invoked the First
Amendment as a shield from the incitement claim. And in addition to
shielding Trump in this instance, that assumption also serves to deter
other similarly situated protestors from ever attempting to bring a First
Amendment claim against the campaign.
Constitutional law often splits society into two realms: public and
private.15 Lawsuits, such as Nwanguma, are complicated by this
distinction, as a party’s constitutional rights and obligations depend on
its classification into one of these realms.16 In the political context,
however, the distinction between public and private is not so cut and
dried, especially as modern electioneering has shifted from being party
centric to increasingly candidate centric.17 Nonetheless, courts must
attempt to adjudicate claims by deciding whether an individual or
organization is a state actor responsible for upholding the
constitutional rights of others or a private actor entitled to
constitutional rights of her own.18 State action analysis governs this
difficult task.19
Adding to this difficulty, the state action doctrine is historically
inconsistent. If “[t]he public–private distinction . . . defines our legal
bedrock, giving shape to legal systems while remaining mostly
unseen, . . . [t]he state action doctrine represents the ragged, rocky
14. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 8, Nwanguma, 273 F. Supp. 3d 719
(No. 16-CV-247) (alterations in original) (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)).
15. John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83 N.C. L. REV.
569, 570 (2005).
16. Id. (“Depending on which domain one is in makes all the difference in how one’s
constitutional rights are adjudicated.”).
17. See infra notes 190–91 and accompanying text.
18. See Fee, supra note 15, at 575 (explaining that the Constitution only “enables and
restrains government power”).
19. Id. at 573.
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outcroppings of this bedrock.”20 Over time, the U.S. Supreme Court
has created a series of “tests” to guide this determination. From the
public-function test to the entwinement approach,21 state action
analysis remains a highly fact-intensive inquiry characterized by
narrow holdings and seemingly contradictory outcomes. Considered a
case study in “doctrinal confusion,”22 the state action doctrine
continues to be the subject of many suggestions for improvement.23
Unlike the work of other scholars in this area,24 this Note does not
attempt a general revision of the state action doctrine. Rather, this
Note presents the doctrine as it applies to political actors, specifically
political candidates and their campaign organizations.25 Building off
the “white primary” cases—in which the Court deemed political parties
to be state actors when they excluded the plaintiffs from voting in the
party’s primary election based solely on race—this Note discusses how
the logic of those cases extends beyond the party to the candidate
herself. Specifically, it argues that as the focus of modern politics has
changed from parties to individual campaigns, the candidates
themselves are an integral “part of the machinery for choosing
[elected] officials”26 and thus can be considered state actors in certain
circumstances.27

20. Christian Turner, State Action Problems, 65 FLA. L. REV. 281, 286 (2013).
21. See infra Part II.C.
22. See, e.g., Christopher W. Schmidt, On Doctrinal Confusion: The Case of the State Action
Doctrine, 2016 BYU L. REV. 575 passim (2016). Professor Christopher Schmidt defines “doctrinal
confusion” as embodying three characteristics: vagueness, complexity, and incoherence. Id. at
604.
23. See generally, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503
(1985) (suggesting the elimination of the state action requirement entirely); Martha Minow,
Alternatives to the State Action Doctrine in the Era of Privatization, Mandatory Arbitration, and
the Internet: Directing Law To Serve Human Needs, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 145 (2017)
(discussing the merits of seven proposed alternative approaches to the state action doctrine);
Turner, supra note 20 (proposing a new two-step institutional approach to analyzing state action
problems).
24. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 23.
25. The phrases “political candidate,” “political campaign,” and “political candidates and
their campaigns” are used interchangeably throughout this Note.
26. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 481 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944)).
27. As there is no singular test for state action and these analyses are highly dependent on
the facts of the situation, this Note does not argue that political candidates should always be
considered state actors in every circumstance. Instead, it identifies several factors, based on the
Supreme Court’s previous holdings and tests, that courts should consider when determining
whether a political candidate’s conduct was state action.
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This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the mechanics of
constitutional tort claims and highlights how these claims require that
the deprivation of constitutional rights occur “‘under color’ of law,”
which is identical to state action analysis.28 Part II traces the evolution
of the state action doctrine and provides an overview of the Court’s
various approaches to identifying state action. Part III describes how
the Court has applied the state action doctrine to political parties and
how it has been more apt to find state action when the private actor has
become an “integral part . . . of the elective process.”29 Finally, Part IV
proposes several relevant factors courts should consider when applying
the state action doctrine to political candidates. Specifically, it argues
that the extensive regulation of campaigns, public funding for
campaigns, other benefits received by candidates, and the status of a
candidate as an incumbent or other state official may weigh in favor of
a finding of state action. It also explores some of the possible
implications of being classified as a state actor on the campaign trail.
I. VEHICLES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CLAIMS
Whether political candidates can be classified as state actors is
irrelevant without avenues to hold candidates accountable for
constitutional torts.30 This Part discusses the current vehicles available
for individuals to bring such claims.
Though the Constitution lays out a multitude of individual rights
and limitations on government power, it notably lacks remedies to
vindicate violations of most of these provisions.31 Historically, plaintiffs
filed suits that evoked common law principles to redress constitutional
violations.32 This resulted in a legal gap, however, as some
constitutional violations were unenforceable because they lacked an
28. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928 (1982) (quoting United States v. Price,
383 U. S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966)).
29. Terry, 345 U.S. at 469 (plurality opinion).
30. “Constitutional violations” and “constitutional torts” are used interchangeably
throughout this Note.
31. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933,
941 (2019) (“The Constitution says almost nothing about remedies for constitutional violations.”).
32. Id. at 943. Professor Fallon illustrates this practice using the example of Little v. Barreme,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), in which a plaintiff brought a trespass claim against a defendant who
seized the plaintiff’s ship. Fallon, supra note 31, at 943. The defendant responded that he was
acting upon orders from the president. Little, 6 U.S. at 178. The Court determined, however, that
the orders were unlawful and thus the defendant’s compliance with those instructions was no
defense. Id. at 179. Therefore, the defendant was held liable. Id.
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adequate common law analog.33 For example, “the right to equal
treatment, the right to vote, [and] the right to procedural due process,
have no neat tort analogues.”34 Additionally, other rights, such as
reproductive rights or free speech, “are uniquely rights against
government action.”35
To fill this gap, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871,36
which created a private cause of action to address the deprivation of
constitutional rights. The law, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
provides that any person who “under color of [state law]” violates the
constitutional rights of another “shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.”37 In Monroe v. Pape,38 the Court explained that the “three
main aims” of the law were to “override certain kinds of state laws,” to
“provide[] a remedy where state law was inadequate,” and “to provide
a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory,
was not available in practice.”39 Essentially, the statute’s primary effect
is to provide access to the federal courts, even when state tort relief is
available, as they are “the most appropriate place for redress of federal
rights.”40
Importantly, § 1983 cannot be used to sue states41 or territories42
directly,43 as “Congress has no power under Article I of the
Constitution to subject states to private damage actions, in either

33. See Fallon, supra note 31, at 945 (“Some constitutional violations always fell beyond the
reach of ordinary tort law for the plain reason that not all violations of constitutional norms were
tortious.”).
34. Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 14 (1980) (footnotes
omitted).
35. Id.
36. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2018)).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
38. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
39. Id. at 173–74. For context, Congress passed the law as part of a federal effort to address
Ku Klux Klan activities in states that had “made no successful effort to bring the guilty to
punishment or afford protection or redress to the outraged and innocent. The State, from lack of
power or inclination, practically denied the equal protection of the law to these persons.” Id. at
175 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 428 (1871) (statement of Rep. John Beatty)).
40. Whitman, supra note 34, at 22–23.
41. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
42. Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 191–92 (1990).
43. However, municipalities and other local government units are considered “persons” and
thus can be sued under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
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federal or state courts, for violating federal statutes.”44 Thus, § 1983
claims must be brought against individual state officers in their
personal capacities.45 The state, however, often ends up indirectly
liable through indemnification contracts or monetary reimbursement
policies for judgments against state officers.46
Additionally, § 1983 only applies to acts committed under color of
state law; it does not apply to federal actors.47 That said, federal actors
can still be held liable for constitutional violations in two ways. First,
federal courts may invoke their broad equitable powers to remedy the
violation.48 Second, for some specific constitutional violations, a
plaintiff may seek damages by filing a Bivens49 claim against the federal
officer.50 However, the Court has greatly limited the availability of
Bivens claims in recent years.51

44. Nick Daum, Comment, Section 1983, Statutes, and Sovereign Immunity, 112 YALE L.J.
353, 353–54 (2002) (referring to the Court’s holdings in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996) and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)).
45. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1991). These suits are based on a “legal fiction”
where “the state official who acts in violation of the federal Constitution is ‘stripped of his official
or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct.’” Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting MSA Realty
Corp. v. Illinois, 990 F.2d 288, 291 (7th Cir. 1993)).
46. Daum, supra note 44, at 355.
47. The exclusion of federal actors was by design. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (“Every person
who, under color of any . . . [law] of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia . . . .”).
48. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (“Once a right
and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”).
49. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
50. A Bivens claim is a judicially created private right of action for damages against federal
actors for certain constitutional violations. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 741 (2020)
(discussing the judicial history of Bivens claims); Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will and the Role
of the Executive in Bivens Actions: What Is Special About Special Factors?, 45 IND. L. REV. 719,
719–20 (2012). In Bivens, plaintiff Warren Bivens alleged that federal agents conducted an
unlawful search of his home, thus violating his Fourth Amendment rights. 403 U.S. at 389–90. In
upholding Bivens’s right to sue, the Court explained that “[a]n agent acting—albeit
unconstitutionally—in the name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm
than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.” Id. at 392. By concluding
that Bivens had “state[d] a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment” against the federal
officials, id. at 397, the Court “effectively held that federal law enables individuals to sue federal
officers for constitutional violations.” James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens:
Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 125 (2009).
51. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (“Given the notable change in the
Court’s approach to recognizing implied causes of action, however, the Court has made clear that
expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009))).
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Invoking the Constitution “as a sword”52 in a § 1983 or Bivens
claim requires proof of two basic elements.53 First, plaintiffs must
“show that they have been deprived of a right ‘secured by the
Constitution and the laws’ of the United States.”54 Second, they must
show that the defendant “deprived them of this right [while] acting
‘under color of [law].’”55 Applying this test to strictly private parties
illustrates its operation. “[M]ost rights secured by the Constitution are
protected only against infringement by governments.”56 Even so, a
private person may still deprive another of those rights by her actions.
Therefore, to subject a private person to liability for a constitutional
violation, a plaintiff must show that the person acted “under color of
law.”57
“Under color of law” has come to be understood “as the same
thing as the ‘state action’ required under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”58 In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,59 the Court made this
point explicit: “If the challenged conduct of respondents constitutes

52. Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1532, 1532 (1972).
53. Though beyond the scope of this Note, the Court’s precedents recognize certain
immunities that protect state actors against lawsuits; these further complicate constitutional tort
claims. Absolute immunity is available to “the President, judges, prosecutors, witnesses, and
officials performing ‘quasi-judicial’ functions, and legislators.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
520 (1985) (citations omitted). Qualified immunity is available to “government officials
performing discretionary functions . . . as long as their actions could reasonably have been
thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 638 (1987). A determination of qualified immunity requires a two-part analysis. First,
the court must consider whether the alleged facts “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party
asserting the injury . . . show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Second, the Court
must determine if “the right was clearly established . . . in light of the specific context of the case.”
Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). Through this analysis, qualified immunity “provides ample
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). If this Note’s framework were adopted, future scholarship could
explore the implications of the immunity doctrines on political candidates and their campaigns.
54. Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 156.
57. Id.
58. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) (quoting United States v. Price, 383
U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966)); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928 (1982)
(“Whether they are identical or not, the state-action and the under-color-of-state-law
requirements are obviously related.”). See infra Part II.A. for a discussion of the Fourteenth
Amendment in greater detail.
59. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
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state action as delimited by our prior decisions, then that conduct was
also action under color of state law and will support a suit under
§ 1983.”60 To summarize, a prerequisite for a successful constitutional
tort claim under § 1983 or Bivens is that the defendant’s challenged
action be classified as state action. What constitutes “state action,”
however, is not as simple an inquiry as it may appear.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
A. “No State shall . . .” and the Origin of State Action
The Fourteenth Amendment provides for equal protection and
due process of law,61 and it secures those rights considered “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.”62 But even though it may be expansive,
the Fourteenth Amendment is limited in at least one important
respect—by the language “No State shall.”63 As Justice Joseph Bradley
elaborated in the Civil Rights Cases,64 “It is State action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is
not the subject-matter of the amendment.”65
The state action requirement serves a dual purpose. First, it
protects individual freedoms against the abuse of government power,66
thus allowing private citizens to “structure their private relations as
they choose subject only to the constraints of statutory or decisional

60. Id. at 935.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Regardless of whether one subscribes to
Justice Hugo Black’s theory of total incorporation, see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71–72
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne of the chief objects that the provisions of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment’s first section, separately, and as a whole, were intended to accomplish was to make
the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states.”), or sides with the Court’s preferred approach of
“selective incorporation,” see Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a
Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 979
n.12 (1985) (providing an overview of the case law applying the Bill of Rights to the states), over
the years the Court “has in fact ruled that most provisions of the Bill of Rights are so fundamental
as to be applicable against the states.” Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Hector R. Lozada, A Nomination
of a Supreme Court Justice: The Incorporation Doctrine Revisited, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 365,
378 (2010).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
64. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
65. Id. at 11.
66. Julie K. Brown, Note, Less Is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 MO. L.
REV. 561, 562–63 (2008).
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law.”67 Second, this requirement protects state actors from liability for
private “conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.”68 In other
words, courts cannot hold the state and its agents liable for private
conduct that violates the Constitution unless the conduct is “fairly
attributable to the State.”69
The state action requirement, however, presents challenges in
application. It inevitably requires drawing a line between private and
state action. This is not always an easy task,70 particularly in the
political context. As the next Section details, the Court has struggled
with this distinction, creating a variety of approaches without providing
one clear answer.
B. The “Precedential Zoo” of State Action
As noted above, the threshold inquiry for almost all constitutional
claims is whether the allegedly violative conduct can be “fairly
attributable to the State.”71 In Lugar, the Court articulated a two-part
approach to this question:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the
State or by a person for whom the State is responsible . . . . Second,
the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor.72

It is this second part where most of the difficulty arises and in
which the Court has been historically inconsistent.73 Scholars portray

67. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991).
68. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
69. Id. at 937.
70. With increased privatization, it is harder to “identify where the government domain ends
and the private domain begins for purposes of constitutional law.” Fee, supra note 15, at 572.
71. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. The lone exception is claims brought under the Thirteenth
Amendment, which the Court has held to control conduct by both state and private actors. The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883) (“Under the Thirteenth Amendment, the
legislation . . . necessary or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery, may be direct
and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation or
not . . . .”); George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94
VA. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (2008).
72. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
73. See John Dorsett Niles, Lauren E. Tribble & Jennifer N. Wimsatt, Making Sense of State
Action, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 885, 886 (2011) (“Unfortunately, finding a meaningful
distinction between ‘state action’ and ‘private action’ has proven difficult. The Court has
considered the problem more than seventy times.” (footnote omitted)).
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the state action doctrine as “a mess”74 and a “precedential zoo.”75 Even
the Court itself has acknowledged the difficulties posed by the doctrine
and its many, jumbled precedents.76 This inconsistency may be due to
shifts in the ideological makeup of the Court over time or the subject
matter of the regulation in question—for example, the Court is more
apt to attribute regulations based on race to state action.77 Or it could
be that the Court’s various approaches are actually a method of
“unstated balancing . . . of whether or not the Constitution needs to
apply.”78 Whatever the reason, much of the doctrine is unquestionably
protean.
Multiple scholars suggest replacing the Court’s current multitude
of tests with a single, comprehensive approach.79 These proposals,
however, are often criticized as “inherently self-defeating.”80 It is
impossible to develop a single approach that is consistent with
precedent and also “meaningfully separate[s] state from private
behavior,” as every private action is influenced by the state to some
degree.81 Rather than considering such alternative approaches, this

74. Turner, supra note 20, at 283.
75. Niles et al., supra note 73, at 886.
76. See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995) (“It is fair to say that
‘our cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of the state have not been a model
of consistency.’” (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting))); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1974) (“While
the principle that private action is immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment is
well established and easily stated, the question whether particular conduct is ‘private,’ on the one
hand, or ‘state action,’ on the other, frequently admits of no easy answer.”).
77. Martin A. Schwartz & Erwin Chemerinsky, Dialogue on State Action, 16 TOURO L. REV.
775, 780–81 (2000) (statement of Prof. Chemerinsky) (explaining, for example, that the Warren
Court was more likely than its successors to find state action).
78. Id. at 807 (emphasis added); see also Fee, supra note 15, at 576 (“Scholars have faulted
the contemporary state action doctrine for its failure to guide concrete cases in a meaningful way,
for its tendency to hide the underlying policy issues that courts must balance, and for its harmful
effects on the politically powerless.” (footnotes omitted)).
79. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and
the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 334 (1993) (proposing an
approach to the public–private distinction by “marking out for constitutional regulation the
affirmative use of the state’s lawmaking power”); Hala Ayoub, Comment, The State Action
Doctrine in State and Federal Courts, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 893, 918–20 (1984) (“[T]he Court
should establish a state action theory that is equally applicable to all circumstances”); see also
Minow, supra note 23, at 160–64 (describing seven proposed alternatives to the current state
action doctrine).
80. Niles et al., supra note 73, at 889.
81. Id.; see also Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—Foreword: “State
Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 90 (1967) (“The
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Section instead surveys the Court’s various formulations of state action
analysis in order to later borrow elements of each to develop a new
framework for political candidates.
The Court’s roving jurisprudence can be distilled into eight
formulations of the same question: What can be fairly attributed to the
state?82 Depending on the circumstances of the case, the Court appears
to cherry-pick which approach it will apply, and parties regularly
advocate for a finding of state action under more than one approach
through argument in the alternative.83 Although not always referred to
by any particular name, the Court’s opinions on state action may be
synthesized to reflect the following approaches: (1) the stateemployment test, (2) the state-instrumentality test, (3) the publicfunction test, (4) the Burton84 interdependence or symbiosis test, (5)
the sufficiently close nexus test, (6) the compulsion or coercion test, (7)
the joint-participation test, and (8) the Brentwood85 entwinement test.86
1. State Employment and State Instrumentality. The simplest tests
to understand and apply are the state-employment and the stateinstrumentality tests. First, the employment test dictates that a
government employee is a state actor while acting in his official
capacity, so long as his “professional and ethical obligations [do not]
require him to act in a role independent of and in opposition to the

commitment of the Court to a single and exclusive theory of state action, or to just five such
theories, with nicely marked limits for each, would be altogether unprincipled, in terms of the
most vital principle of all—the reality principle.”).
82. Many of these formulations have shared elements, but the Author has chosen to describe
them as eight distinct approaches to demonstrate both the doctrine’s evolution and the Court’s
inconsistency with regard to describing and analyzing state action questions. Admittedly, the lines
between some of the approaches can be a bit blurry and the differences may seem semantic.
However, this Note’s ultimate goal is to create a new approach for analyzing state action in the
context of political campaigns. As such, this comprehensive overview is useful both to show the
wide variety of methodologies that a court may use to identify state action and to demonstrate
that the idea of creating a novel approach for state action analysis for one specific context is not
so absurd given the Court’s willingness to adapt its approach to fit the case before it.
83. See, e.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1933 (2019)
(addressing the plaintiff-respondent’s two alternative arguments for recognizing state action).
84. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
85. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
86. These eight tests reflect the Author’s own synthesis of the Court’s opinions. They are not
presented in any chronological fashion nor in terms of the Court’s seeming preference for them.
However, the following subsections do try to indicate whether an approach has been used more
or less frequently over time.
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State.”87 For example, a physician contracted by the state to provide
medical services to inmates is a state actor while performing this
function.88 However, a public defender is not a state actor when
performing traditional legal duties for a criminal defendant.89 Second,
the instrumentality test signifies that government instrumentalities,
including agencies, are considered state actors. For instance, in Lebron
v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,90 the Court found state action
when Amtrak refused to place the plaintiff’s advertisement in Penn
Station, in an alleged violation of his First Amendment rights.91
Because Amtrak was a corporation created by the federal government
to further governmental objectives and the majority of its directors
were permanently appointed by the government, it was considered an
instrumentality of the state for the purpose of determining its
constitutional obligations.92 With these as a starting point, one can
venture into the less axiomatic state action formulations, starting with
the public-function test.
2. Public Function. The public-function test can be traced back to
Marsh v. Alabama,93 where the Court held that it was unconstitutional
to enforce a state trespassing statute against a Jehovah’s Witness who
was distributing religious literature on the sidewalks of a privately
owned company town.94 The Court explained that the more a private
property owner opens that property for public use, “the more do his
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights
of those who use it.”95 Because the town’s citizens had “an identical
interest in the functioning of the community,” regardless of whether
the ownership was public or private, “the channels of communication
[had to] remain free.”96
87. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49–50 (1988).
88. See id. at 56 (“Whether a physician is on the state payroll or is paid by contract, the
dispositive issue concerns the relationship among the State, the physician, and the prisoner . . . . It
is the physician’s function while working for the State . . . that determines whether he is acting
under color of state law.”).
89. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).
90. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
91. Id. at 377, 400.
92. Id. at 377, 394, 400.
93. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
94. Id. at 503, 509.
95. Id. at 506.
96. Id. at 507.

SMITH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2/23/2021 9:08 PM

2021 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL 1487
From this decision came the broader principle that a private party
becomes a state actor, for purposes of constitutional claims, when that
party serves a public function.97 But this doctrine does not mean that
any “private entity [which] performs a function which serves the
public” is a state actor.98 Rather, an act is a public function if it is one
that has been traditionally and exclusively performed by the state.99 For
example, ruling on peremptory challenges in jury selection100 and
conducting elections101 are traditionally exclusive public functions and
are thus transformed into state action even if carried out by private
actors.102 In contrast, the settlement of disputes between debtors and
creditors, even in the court system,103 and the “operation of public
access channels on a cable system”104 are not considered traditional,
exclusive public functions.
Applied in only limited settings, such as those previously
mentioned, the public-function test does not mean that “all businesses
‘affected with the public interest’ are state actors in all their actions.”105
However, other approaches, such as the interdependence or symbiosis
test, do tend to sweep private conduct into the realm of state action
more broadly.
3. Burton Interdependence or Symbiosis. The interdependence or
symbiosis approach, which emphasizes a more holistic review of the
97. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972) (“In effect, the owner of the company
town [in Marsh] was performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and stood in the shoes of
the State.”).
98. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
99. See Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978) (“While many functions have been
traditionally performed by governments, very few have been ‘exclusively reserved to the State.’”).
100. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 50, 55 (1992) (holding that a criminal defendant who
used peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race was a state actor); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624, 627 (1991) (holding that a private litigant in a civil case
who used peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely based on race was a state actor).
101. See Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 158 (noting that conducting elections for public office “is
an exclusively public function,” a “clear” principle drawn from Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); and Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932)).
102. See, e.g., McCollum, 505 U.S. at 54 (“[W]hen ‘a government confers on a private body
the power to choose the government’s employees or officials, the private body will be bound by
the constitutional mandate of race neutrality.’” (quoting Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 625)).
103. Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 161. But see id. at 162 n.12 (“This is not to say that dispute
resolution between creditors and debtors involves a category of human affairs that is never subject
to constitutional constraints.”).
104. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019).
105. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
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facts and circumstances surrounding the action, can be traced back to
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.106 In Burton, the Court held
that a privately owned restaurant located within a parking building
owned and operated by a Delaware state agency was a state actor when
it refused to serve the plaintiff because of his race.107 Though the
Court’s rather narrow holding was confined to the specific facts that
the private actor was a lessee of public property,108 the Court’s
reasoning demonstrates a much broader approach.
The Court made clear that determining “a precise formula for
recognition of state responsibility . . . is an ‘impossible task,’” and
“[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance.”109 In Burton, the activities and obligations of the private
lessee, the responsibilities of the public lessor, the mutual benefits of
the relationship, and the location of the private restaurant in a
government building together indicated the restaurant’s discriminatory
practice was indeed state action.110 The Court has referred to this type
of analysis as a test of interdependence111 or symbiosis,112 but regardless
of the terminology, one realization emerges: this type of inquiry is
highly fact specific.
The Court has not relied on the Burton test with the same
frequency as other state action formulations.113 Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor strongly criticized it as one that “sweeps much too broadly
and would subject to constitutional challenge the most pedestrian of
everyday activities.”114 However, the Court’s emphasis on a holistic
106. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
107. Id. at 716–17, 719.
108. See id. at 725–26 (“Specifically defining the limits of our inquiry, what we hold today is
that when a State leases public property in the manner and for the purpose shown to have been
the case here, the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with by the
lessee . . . .”).
109. Id. at 722 (quoting Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947)).
110. Id. at 724.
111. See id. at 725 (“The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
with [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.”).
112. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972) (“Here there is nothing
approaching the symbiotic relationship between lessor and lessee that was present in Burton.”).
113. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 57–58 (1999) (characterizing Burton
as merely a vaguer version of the joint-participation test established in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991 (1982) and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)).
114. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 411 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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review of the facts has carried through into other, similar approaches,
including the nexus test.
4. Sufficiently Close Nexus. Along the same lines as Burton, the
nexus test is also highly fact specific.115 In this formulation, however,
the Court asks “whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action of the [private] entity so that the action
of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”116 In
conducting this analysis, no single factor is dispositive, rather many
factors must be considered in the aggregate.117
Several are particularly relevant.118 First, a court might consider
how heavily regulated a private entity is when assessing state action,
though the existence of regulation without other factors is unlikely to
result in the finding of a nexus.119 Second, whether a private party has
a government-protected monopoly may also indicate state action,
though the challenged action and the party’s monopoly status must be
sufficiently connected.120 Third, a court might consider whether the
private entity receives some kind of benefit or assistance from the
state.121 And fourth, the receipt of public funding may denote state

115. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351 (“The true nature of the State’s involvement may not be
immediately obvious, and detailed inquiry may be required in order to determine whether the
test is met.”).
116. Id. at 350–51.
117. See id. (discussing several factors that may contribute to finding a nexus); id. at 360
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he dispositive question in any state-action case is not whether any
single fact or relationship presents a sufficient degree of state involvement, but rather whether
the aggregate of all relevant factors compels a finding of state responsibility.”).
118. What follows is a list of factors mentioned by the Court; however, this list is not
exhaustive.
119. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350–51 (“[A]cts of a heavily regulated utility with at least
something of a governmentally protected monopoly will more readily be found to be ‘state’
acts.”).
120. See id. at 351–52 (referring to Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952),
in which the Court disclaimed reliance on the challenged private entity’s status as a
“congressionally established monopoly” in its state action analysis).
121. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991). State benefits are still not
dispositive. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972) (“The Court has never
held, of course, that . . . [there is state action] if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or
service at all from the State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree whatever.”). Also,
note that “benefit” is a more encompassing term than “funding,” and may include such things as
statutory protections or other services provided by the state. See, e.g., id. (referencing “statefurnished services” such as “electricity, water, and police and fire protection”).
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action, though even total dependence on this funding does not
automatically convert private action into state action.122
In cases before the Supreme Court, the nexus test has not often
produced a finding of state action, even after consideration of these
factors.123 Although this approach remains good law and is frequently
cited,124 what exactly constitutes a sufficiently close nexus is unclear.
5. Compulsion or Coercion. Unlike the Burton and nexus
formulations, the Court has been much more direct when it comes to
finding state action based on compulsion by the state. As articulated in
Adickes v. S.H. Kress,125 “a State is responsible for the . . . act of a
private party when the State, by its law, has compelled the act.”126 For
example, it is state action where a private restaurant refuses to serve
people based on race because a city ordinance requires segregated
eating facilities.127 That said, there is a distinction between compulsion

122. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840, 843 (1982) (finding no state action when
a private school discharged an employee without due process even though it depended on the
state for virtually all of its funding).
123. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 347, 358 (holding it was not state action for a utility
company, though extensively regulated and possessing a state-protected monopoly, to terminate
a woman’s service without notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to pay her debts); Moose Lodge
No. 107, 407 U.S. at 171–72, 177 (deciding it was not state action for a private club to refuse service
to a customer based on race, even though the club was only permitted to sell alcoholic beverages
because the state liquor board had issued the club a license); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 837, 840,
843 (ruling it was not state action for a private school, primarily funded with public funds, to
discharge a school counselor without due process for exercising her First Amendment rights).
124. See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999) (“Thus, the private
insurers in this case will not be held to constitutional standards unless ‘there is a sufficiently close
nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity . . . .’”); Rawson v.
Recovery Innovations, Inc., 975 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2020) (describing the “close nexus” test);
Preston v. New York, 223 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing the “sufficiently
close nexus” and “symbiotic relationships” tests); Eaton v. Univ. of Del., C.A. No. 00-709, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10762, at *10–13 (D. Del. July 31, 2001) (concluding that a university’s action
was state action under both the nexus and symbiosis tests because the state had explicitly
conferred powers to the university to appoint law enforcement officers, provided it with benefits
(such as land grants and tax advantages), was involved in setting curriculum requirements, and
the governor sat on the university’s board of trustees).
125. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
126. Id. at 170.
127. Id.
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and permission,128 and only the former results in an automatic finding
of state action.129
Beyond explicit compulsion, the Court has also found state action
where the state has “exercised coercive power or has provided such
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must
in law be deemed to be that of the State.”130 In the same way that state
permission is not considered compulsion, state inaction is not
“authorization” or “encouragement” by the state, at least for the sake
of the coercion test.131
6. Joint Participation. Despite its seeming reluctance to find state
action where there is mere acquiescence or permission under the
coercion or compulsion test, the Court has found state action where
the private party engaged in “joint participation” with the state.132 A
private party acts “‘under color’ of law” when “he is a willful
participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.”133 For example,
in Lugar, the Court found state action where the defendant, through
an ex parte, prejudgment petition, acted jointly with the state to attach
the plaintiff’s property without due process.134 The Court later clarified,
in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope,135 that “[p]rivate
use of state-sanctioned private remedies or procedures does not rise to
the level of state action . . . . But when private parties make use of state
procedures with the overt, significant assistance of state officials, state
action may be found.”136 Judicial enforcement of private agreements
alone, however, does not typically constitute state action.137
128. See Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165 (1978) (“[T]he State of New York is in
no way responsible for Flagg Brothers’ decision, a decision which the State in § 7-210 permits but
does not compel . . . .”). This distinction is probably most clearly exemplified by a statute reading
“an individual must” versus “an individual may.” Additionally, the Court has rejected arguments
by plaintiffs that the completion of state-mandated forms and paperwork indicates state action.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 55.
129. See Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 164 (“This Court, however, has never held that a State’s
mere acquiescence in a private action converts that action into that of the State.”).
130. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
131. Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 54.
132. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982).
133. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966).
134. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941–42.
135. Tulsa Pro. Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
136. Id. at 485–86.
137. Fee, supra note 15, at 582. One exception is presented in Shelley v. Kraemer, in which the
Court found state action when private actors relied on court enforcement of private agreements
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C. A Twenty-First Century Development: Brentwood Entwinement
Over the years, the conservative wing of the Court has evinced a
preference for a “‘rule-oriented’ approach” to state action that favors
more concrete tests, such as the public-function or coercion tests, yet
the liberal wing tends to prefer a more “totality of the circumstances”
approach.138 As the “precedential zoo” developed through the
twentieth century, the conservative view appeared to dominate.139 But
at the turn of the twenty-first century, the Court provided a new
formulation of the same type of fact-intensive inquiry used in the
Burton and nexus cases.140
In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association, the Court considered whether the enforcement of a rule
against a member school by a statewide association responsible for
regulating interscholastic athletic competition among public and
private high schools could be considered state action.141 Citing the
nexus test, the Court explained that “what is fairly attributable [to the
state] is a matter of normative judgment, . . . [and] no one fact can
function as a necessary condition across the board for finding state
action.”142 Even so, that normative judgment should be based on a
finding that “[t]he nominally private character of the [entity] is
overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and
public officials in its composition and workings, and there is no
substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional
standards.”143

that included race-based restrictive covenants. Id. at 581–82 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948)). The Shelley Court explained that the state “ha[d] made available . . . the full coercive
power of government to deny” the plaintiffs equal protection of the law, and that “the action of
state courts and of judicial officers in their official capacities” is always regarded as state action.
334 U.S. at 14, 19. However, this case is considered an anomaly and has not since been relied
upon. Fee, supra note 15, at 582.
138. Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1391 (2006).
139. Id. at 1382, 1391–92.
140. Id.; see also supra Part II.B.3. While both are fact-intensive, Brentwood takes a slightly
more formulaic approach to the holistic review endorsed by Burton, focusing on both top-down
and bottom-up entwinement of the state and the private entity. See infra notes 141–47 and
accompanying text.
141. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 290 (2001).
142. Id. at 295.
143. Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
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Without providing an exact definition of “pervasive
entwinement,” the Court suggested that it exists when the relevant
facts indicate a “largely overlapping identity” between the state and
the private entity.144 Here, 84 percent of the association’s membership
consisted of public schools, and each member school had a
representative who voted for the association’s governing bodies.145 In
addition to this bottom-up entwinement, there was top-down
entwinement in that members of the Tennessee State Board of
Education served on the association’s governing bodies, and
association employees received the same state retirement benefits as
state employees.146 On these facts, the Court held that the association
had engaged in state action.147
Even though it found state action, the Court acknowledged that
facts indicating entwinement “may be outweighed in the name of some
value at odds with finding public accountability in the
circumstances.”148 However, the Court was fairly vague in explaining
what would constitute a “substantial reason to claim unfairness.”149 It
rejected the association’s argument that its classification as a state actor
would result in “an epidemic of unprecedented federal litigation” and
that “the social utility of expanding [the] class [of possible defendant
actors]” weighed against this classification.150
Justice Clarence Thomas dissented in Brentwood, fearing the
majority’s unprecedented holding “not only extend[ed] state-action
doctrine beyond its permissible limits but also encroache[d] upon the
realm of individual freedom that the doctrine was meant to protect.”151
That said, Justice Thomas may not yet have much to fear, as the
entwinement test has been applied—though inconsistently—rather

144. Id. at 303 (emphasizing that “entwinement”—like “‘[c]oercion’ and ‘encouragement’”—
is another way of “referring to kinds of facts that can justify characterizing an ostensibly private
action as public instead”).
145. Id. at 299–300.
146. Id. at 300.
147. Id. at 302.
148. Id. at 303.
149. Id. at 298.
150. Id. at 304–05.
151. Id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 314–15 (“Because the majority never
defines ‘entwinement,’ the scope of its holding is unclear . . . . I am not prepared to say that any
private organization that permits public entities and public officials to participate acts as the State
in anything or everything it does . . . .”).
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narrowly in the circuit courts.152 Further, in a 2019 opinion, Justice
Brett Kavanaugh, writing for the Court, did not even mention
entwinement in his examples of the “few limited circumstances” in
which a private entity qualifies as a state actor.153 Nonetheless,
entwinement is now a part of the state action doctrine and opens up
the possibility that new, more fact-intensive approaches to state action
analysis—such as the framework this Note proposes in the campaign
context—may be permissible.
III. THE CLASSIFICATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES AS STATE ACTORS
Again, plaintiffs can vindicate constitutional violations committed
by private parties if the private action is found to actually constitute
state action—an analysis for which the Court has developed several
approaches over the years. This Part examines how the doctrine has
been applied to find state action on the part of seemingly private
political parties.
A. Political Parties and the White Primary Cases
Political parties154 walk the line between private and public.155
Though “not formally one of the national political institutions,” parties
152. See, e.g., P.R.B.A. Corp. v. HMS Host Toll Roads, Inc., 808 F.3d 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2015)
(deciding there was no entwinement between the state and a private operator of highway service
plazas because there was no personnel overlap or specific involvement of the state in the
challenged activity—the decision to remove brochures for a “gentleman’s club” from the plaza
common areas); Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps., 768 F.3d 259, 269 (2d
Cir. 2014) (holding there was no entwinement between the state and a private nonprofit
contracted by the state to provide emergency medical and ambulance services because the
nonprofit did not receive the majority of its funding from the town, and the town did not have any
say in the nonprofit’s management or personnel decisions); Johnson v. Rodrigues, 293 F.3d 1196,
1205 (10th Cir. 2002) (comparing the entwinement test to the symbiosis test and citing the
dictionary definition of “entwine”—“to twine together, to interweave, attach or involve
inextricably in sentiment or thought”—in arriving at its conclusion).
153. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019) (listing “(i)
when the private entity performs a traditional, exclusive public function; (ii) when the government
compels the private entity to take a particular action; or (iii) when the government acts jointly
with the private entity” (citations omitted)).
154. This Note defines “political party” as “an association, committee, or organization which
nominates [or selects] a candidate for election to . . . office whose name appears on [an] election
ballot as the candidate of [the] association, committee, or organization.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(16)
(2018).
155. See Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A
Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 777 (2000) (“The crux of the
problem political parties pose for lawyers and judges derives from parties’ uncertain
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play an essential role in the maintenance of American democracy.156
The white primary cases—which predate many of the cases described
above—assessed whether the actions of political parties could be
considered state action.157
In the first of the three white primary cases, Nixon v. Condon,158
the Texas Democratic Party, through its State Executive Committee,
adopted a resolution that only white Democrats could vote in the
primary.159 The Committee was empowered by statute to adopt
resolutions determining primary voter qualifications, but it did not
have the inherent power to do so.160 Because the Committee’s authority
derived entirely from the state, the Court held that the party had
“become to that extent [an] organ[] of the State itself, [a] repositor[y]
of official power.”161 By granting the political party this authority—
which the Court recognized as especially significant, as it caused the
party to then become the means by which government itself is
established and continued—the state had discharged its functions so as
to discriminate on the basis of race. Thus, the Court determined that
the party’s action was state action.162
The Court again relied upon the role of the primary as an “integral
part of the election machinery”163 to find state action in Smith v.
Allwright.164 There, the Texas Democratic Party independently
adopted a resolution at its State Convention limiting party membership

constitutional and legal status . . . . A substantial amount of the caselaw in this area rests on
whether judges switch on the state actor toggle.”).
156. See Robert C. Wigton, American Political Parties Under the First Amendment, 7 J.L. &
POL’Y 411, 413–14 (1999) (“[P]olitical parties . . . have long provided what may be considered
quasi-governmental services, including candidate recruitment, the operation of political
campaigns, and the supervision of the voting process.”).
157. Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the Consequences of
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 58 (2001). The following cases do not
specifically refer to one or more of the tests described in supra Part II by name. Even so, elements
of each test are present in the Court’s analysis, including elements of the public-function,
instrumentality, compulsion, and joint-participation approaches.
158. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
159. Id. at 82.
160. Id. at 88.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 88–89.
163. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318–20 (1941).
164. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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to white individuals.165 Unlike Condon, there was no state statute or
other grant of power influencing the party’s decision regarding its
membership.166 The party claimed it was permitted to adopt such a
resolution because as a “voluntary organization,” it was “free to select
its own membership.”167 The Court rejected this argument, however,
holding instead that because the party was required to abide by a
statutory system in order for its nominees to appear on the general
election ballot, the party was “an agency of the state” for the
determination of primary election participation.168 “When primaries
become a part of the machinery for choosing officials,” the state, in
adopting a general election ballot of party nominees, “endorses, adopts
and enforces the discrimination . . . practiced by [the] party.”169
Therefore, the party’s action was considered state action.170
In 1953, the Court took its reasoning in Smith a step further. In
Terry v. Adams,171 the Jaybird Democratic Association, a voluntary
political organization, excluded Black individuals from participating in
its primaries.172 The winners of the Jaybird primary nearly always
entered the subsequent Democratic primary and won the
nomination.173 In his plurality opinion, Justice Hugo Black found that
the Jaybird primary had become an “integral part . . . of the elective
process,” even though neither the state nor the party controlled any
aspect of the Jaybird elections.174 Because the Democratic primary and
general election had become “no more than the perfunctory ratifiers
of the choice that ha[d] already been made in [the] Jaybird election[],”
it was immaterial that the state did not directly control the Jaybird
primary process.175 Because “the effect of the whole procedure, Jaybird
primary plus Democratic primary plus general election” resulted in the
165. Id. at 656–57. The right to vote in the Democratic primary was conditioned on party
membership. Id.
166. Klarman, supra note 157, at 59.
167. Smith, 321 U.S. at 657.
168. Id. at 663 (“The party takes its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon
it by state statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law because they are performed
by a political party.”).
169. Id. at 664.
170. Id.
171. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
172. Id. at 462–63 (plurality opinion).
173. Id. at 463.
174. Id. at 469.
175. Id.
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deprivation of Black individuals’ rights to vote, the Jaybird Association
was held to be a state actor.176 In his concurring opinion, Justice Tom
Clark explained this principle even more broadly:
Any “part of the machinery for choosing officials” becomes subject
to the Constitution’s restraints . . . . [W]hen a state structures its
electoral apparatus in a form which devolves upon a political
organization the uncontested choice of public officials, that
organization itself, in whatever disguise, takes on those attributes of
government which draw the Constitution’s safeguards into play.177

The white primary cases were the first instances of the Court
finding state action due to its recognition of the essential role that
political parties play in the democratic process. This reasoning has
since been even further expanded.
B. Modern Treatment of Political Parties
Beyond the white primary cases, the Court has treated political
parties as state actors in other circumstances as well.178 For example, in
Gray v. Sanders,179 the Court determined that the Georgia Democratic
primary’s use of the “county unit system”180 violated the “one person,
one vote” principle.181 Because the state “adopts the primary as a part
of the public election machinery[,] . . . state regulation of this
preliminary phase of the election process makes it state action.”182

176. See id. at 469–70 (holding that by depriving Black individuals of the right to vote, the
Texas Democratic Party violated the Fifteenth Amendment).
177. Id. at 481, 484 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, 664 (1944)).
178. Similar to the white primary cases, these cases do not refer to a particular state action
test by name. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. However, the Court’s reasoning seems
to borrow elements from the public-function, interdependence or symbiosis, nexus, and jointparticipation approaches.
179. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
180. Under this system, each county had a specific number of representatives in the state
legislature. Id. at 370–71. Candidates for primary nominations who won the popular vote in each
county were entitled “to two votes for each representative to which the county is entitled.” Id. at
371. “[T]he majority of the county unit vote nominated a United States Senator and Governor;
the plurality of the county unit vote nominated the others.” Id. According to the plaintiff, this
worked out so that one unit vote in a county comprising of 14.11 percent of Georgia’s total
population represented 92,721 residents, whereas one unit vote in a county comprising 0.05
percent of the state’s total population represented 938 residents. Id.
181. Id. at 381.
182. Id. at 374–75.
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Following a similar line of reasoning, in Morse v. Republican Party
of Virginia,183 the Court held that the Virginia Republican Party was
acting under the authority of the state184 when it required a party
registration fee to participate in the primary.185 Justice John Paul
Stevens, in his plurality opinion, explained that because the state has
sole authority to set qualifications for ballot access and reserves two
places on its ballot for the major parties, the parties are effectively
“delegated the power to determine part of the field of candidates from
which the voters must choose.”186 By accepting the party’s selection,
the state “‘endorses, adopts and enforces’ the delegate qualifications
set by the Party for the right to choose that nominee.”187
Like in Gray, the Morse Court explained that it is “‘recognition of
the place of the primary in the electoral scheme,’ rather than the degree
of state control over it,” that indicates state action when the party is
granted authority to determine primary-voter qualifications.188 These
cases make clear that political parties are especially susceptible to
crossing the line between private and state action due to the
fundamental role they play in the maintenance of American
democracy.189 This realization, however, raises the questions: How far
can this reasoning reach? Could it ever extend past the party to the
candidate herself?
IV. POLITICAL CANDIDATES AND CAMPAIGNS AS STATE ACTORS
Over time, the political campaign has shifted from smaller
operations—which focused mostly on retail politics with a larger

183. Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186 (1996).
184. Specifically, the Court considered whether the Republican Party of Virginia was subject
to the same preclearance requirement of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act as the state of Virginia. Id.
at 190 (plurality opinion). Justice John Paul Stevens explained that the “operative test” for
determining whether the political party is subject to § 5 is “whether [the] political party exercises
power over the electoral process.” Id. at 218.
185. See id. at 190, 199–200 (“In concluding that the regulation applies to the Party, we are
guided by the reasoning of Smith v. Allwright, [321 U.S. 649 (1944)] . . . .”).
186. Id. at 197–98 (quoting Smith, 321 U.S. at 664).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 199 (quoting Smith, 321 U.S. at 660).
189. The Court has stated it will not interject itself into the inner workings of the political
party organization. See O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4 (1972) (per curiam) (“[No] court
has . . . interject[ed] itself into the deliberative processes of a national political
convention . . . . [T]he convention itself is the proper forum for determining intra-party
disputes . . . .”).
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emphasis on the political party—to what scholars call the “new-style”
of electioneering.190 Now, “[t]he candidate, rather than the
party, . . . tends
to
be
the
chief
focus
of . . . campaign
communication.”191 However, political parties today are not totally
irrelevant. To the contrary, they have transformed “into ‘serviceoriented’ organizations” that provide candidates with financial and
human capital, as well as “serve as ‘brokers,’ linking ‘candidates and
interest groups, the individual contributors, the political consultants,
and the powerful incumbents who possess some of the money, political
contacts, and campaign experience that candidates need.’”192 That said,
as elections become more candidate centric, and thus campaigns
become an even more integral part of the elective process,193 it would
logically follow that the actions of political candidates and their
campaign organizations should be assessed more closely for possible
state action.
A. A New Framework for Assessing Political Candidates and
Campaigns for State Action
Because there is no single state action test and the approaches
detailed above are particularly fact intensive,194 it would be impossible
to argue that political candidates are categorically state actors for the
purposes of constitutional tort claims. However, based on the Court’s
precedents, courts should consider several factors when determining
the threshold question of whether a political candidate and her
campaign can be considered a state actor.195 Abiding by state action
precedent, no one factor is dispositive, nor will each factor be relevant
to every approach outlined in Part II. However, as constitutional torts
and the campaign trail collide, the following considerations weigh in
favor of holding political candidates and their campaigns to be state
190. MICHAEL BURTON, WILLIAM J. MILLER & DANIEL M. SHEA, CAMPAIGN CRAFT: THE
STRATEGIES, TACTICS, AND ART OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGN MANAGEMENT xv–xvi (5th ed.
2015).
191. Id. at xviii (quoting ROBERT AGRANOFF, THE NEW STYLE IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 4
(1972)).
192. Id. (quoting PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 111 (6th ed. 2012)).
193. See supra notes 171–77 and accompanying text (describing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953)).
194. See supra Part II.B–C.
195. Although many of the examples in the following analysis refer to federal elections, the
framework here is not limited to federal elections. The factors outlined may very well play a role
in elections at the state and local levels and should be considered by courts accordingly.
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actors, under either a current or new test designed to assess state action
in the context of modern election realities.
First, as incorporated from the nexus test,196 courts should
recognize that political campaigns and elections are extensively
regulated.197 To start, the state determines who is permitted to run for
which office,198 as Smith emphasized.199 Then, the state establishes the
process for a candidate to run—this includes certain paperwork
requirements, filing fees, disclosure requirements, and so on.200
Campaign finance is also the subject of detailed regulation. For
instance, the Federal Election Campaign Act201 sets limits on political
contributions, requires candidates to report from where their money is
raised and how it is spent, and provides for oversight and enforcement
by the Federal Election Commission.202 Granted, many industries are
extensively regulated, and the Court has emphasized that mere
regulation alone does not indicate state action.203 However, given the
critical importance of election regulations to preserving the democratic

196. See supra Part II.B.4 (describing the nexus test).
197. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (explaining that courts may consider the
extensive regulation of a challenged activity, though mere regulation is not alone enough to find
state action). For a summary of election laws, see Voting and Election Laws, USA.GOV (Sept. 1,
2020), https://www.usa.gov/voting-laws [https://perma.cc/B8D7-P77X].
198. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (requiring that an individual running for president
be at least thirty-five years of age, a natural-born U.S. citizen, and a resident of the United States
for fourteen years); Who Can Become a Candidate for State Legislator, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/who-canbecome-a-candidate-for-state-legislator.aspx [https://perma.cc/H5PU-STN7] (listing each state’s
eligibility requirements for state legislators).
199. See supra notes 168–68 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Filing Fees for Candidates for State Legislator, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 16, 2020) http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/filingfees-for-candidates-for-state-legislators.aspx [https://perma.cc/48CR-HZZR] (listing the filing
fees for state-legislature candidates in the thirty-three states that require major party candidates
to pay such fees); Paperwork Requirements for Filing as a Candidate for State Legislator, NAT’L
CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (June 3, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/paperwork-requirements-for-filing-as-a-candidate-for-state-legislator.aspx [https://
perma.cc/5XT6-PMTT] (listing each state’s paperwork requirements for state-legislature
candidates).
201. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 52 U.S.C. § 30101 (2018).
202. See Contribution Limits, FED . ELECTION COMM’ N, https://www.fec.gov/helpcandidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/contribution-limits [https://perma.cc/
HS5U-G7XR] (listing, for example, contribution limits for individual donors to candidate
committees and PACs for the 2019–20 federal-election cycle).
203. This point was reemphasized as recently as 2019 in Manhattan Community Access Corp.
v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1932 (2019).
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institutions that the Constitution was designed to protect, perhaps a
slight divergence from precedent is appropriate. That is, in the political
context, the nature of the state’s heavy involvement in election
regulation should be considered a more relevant factor in the state
action analysis than perhaps regulation of an industry less vital to
democracy, such as utilities.204
Second, and relatedly, courts should consider the involvement of
public funding in political campaigns. Doing so would be consistent
with both the nexus and Burton approaches. To address concerns that
elections could be bought by private interest groups, public-election
funding programs began in the 1970s with the Presidential Public
Funding Program (“PPFP”).205 Through PPFP, candidates for
president seeking nomination in a political party’s primary are eligible
for primary matching funds from the federal government,206 and major
party nominees in the general election are eligible to receive $20
million plus a cost of living adjustment—in 2020, this would have been
$103.7 million—in exchange for foregoing all private contributions.207
These programs are funded through the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund, which is raised through the three-dollar check-off on
the 1040 federal income tax form.208
204. Cf. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974) (stating that the extensive
regulation of an electric company did not alone transform its action into state action).
205. See generally MICHAEL G. MILLER, SUBSIDIZING DEMOCRACY (2013) (discussing
public-election funding in the United States).
206. To receive this funding, the candidate must raise more than five thousand dollars in each
of at least twenty states and receive contributions from a minimum of twenty separate donors in
each state. Public Funding of Presidential Elections, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://
www.fec.gov/introduction-campaign-finance/understanding-ways-support-federal-candidates/
presidential-elections/public-funding-presidential-elections [https://perma.cc/FA8S-YQ23].
Additionally, the candidate must limit campaign spending for all primary elections combined to
$10 million plus a cost-of-living adjustment—in 2020, this national spending limit amounted to
$51.85 million—and campaign spending in each state must be limited to a specific amount based
on the number of potential voters in a state. Id.; Presidential Spending Limits for 2020, FED.
ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/understanding-publicfunding-presidential-elections/presidential-spending-limits-2020 [https://perma.cc/TP44-799L].
207. Id. Some partial public funding is available for minor- and new-party candidates who
meet certain vote-share requirements. Id. Notably, no major party nominee in the presidential
election has accepted public funding since John McCain did so in 2008. See id. (noting that 2008
was “the last year a major party candidate chose to accept a general election grant”); FEC
Certifies Funds for McCain General Election Campaign, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (Sept. 8, 2008),
https://www.fec.gov/updates/fec-certifies-funds-for-mccain-general-election-campaign [https://
perma.cc/8MDG-DTY2] (announcing that the FEC had “approved payment of $84.1 million in
federal funds for the general election campaign of John McCain and Sarah Palin”).
208. Public Funding of Presidential Elections, supra note 206.
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Since PPFP’s creation, fourteen states have also provided some
form of public financing option for state campaigns, either in the form
of “clean election” bills—which provide full funding for the
campaign—or matching funds, which offer partial funding up to a
specific amount.209 Scholars find that these public funding programs
can impact election outcomes, and some argue that they decrease the
electoral incumbency advantage by approximately 50 percent.210 Even
if the decrease in incumbency advantage is not so marked, it is clear
that public funding does increase competitiveness in elections by
encouraging new candidates to enter the race.211 Public funding’s
potential to impact the outcome of an election makes the acceptance
of such funding weigh in favor of a finding of state action, though the
exact weight may vary depending on the amount of public funding
accepted compared to a candidate’s total fundraising.
Third, courts should take into account, in addition to public
funding, whether a political candidate has received other benefits
throughout her campaign that would suggest a closer relationship
between the candidate and the state, similar to the Court’s analysis in
Burton.212 For example, major party nominees generally have an easier
time accessing the ballot compared to unaffiliated candidates,213 as
Terry acknowledged.214 Additionally, at the federal level, the U.S.
Secret Service provides protection to “[m]ajor Presidential and Vice

209. Public Financing of Campaigns: Overview, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 8,
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/public-financing-of-campaigns-overview
.aspx [https://perma.cc/U4KZ-CLJ6].
210. Andrew B. Hall, How the Public Funding of Elections Increases Candidate Polarization
14 (Jan. 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/
Hall-2014-Tax-Financing-And-Polarization.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9EN-9X4P].
211. Neil Malhotra, The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral Competition: Evidence from
Arizona and Maine, 8 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 263, 277 (2008) (“[T]he empirical evidence on
public financing suggests that these programs do not simply fill the coffers of unserious and lowquality candidates, but rather they help serious contestants mount effective challenges.”).
212. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
213. See generally Summary: State Laws Regarding Presidential Ballot Access for the General
Election, NAT’L ASS’N SEC’YS STATE (Jan. 2020), https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/surveys/
2020-07/research-ballot-access-president-Jan200.pdf [https://perma.cc/MS72-WSES] (providing
an overview of state legislation regarding presidential-ballot access for party-affiliated and
independent candidates).
214. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
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Presidential candidates,” as determined by the secretary of Homeland
Security.215
The final factor courts should consider is a candidate’s status as an
incumbent or challenger. Political science literature has identified a
clear incumbency advantage in U.S. elections.216 For instance,
incumbents receive free publicity and frequent constituent interaction
while in office.217 Thus, even though incumbents are campaigning for
reelection in their personal capacity, the fact that they are a state actor
in their official capacity makes them more likely to defeat any non“official state actor” challengers. Placing some weight on a candidate’s
status as an incumbent when analyzing their conduct for state action
would help to address the current illogical distinction between
incumbents acting in their official versus private capacity.218
Additionally, from a Brentwood entwinement perspective,219 an
incumbent candidate’s campaign is more likely to have a “largely
overlapping identity” with the state.220 After all, the candidate herself
is a government official, and it is likely that other government officials
will also be involved in the incumbent’s reelection efforts.221 Granted,
some of the government officials would be acting in their personal
capacities due to limitations on the political activity of government

215. 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a)(7) (2018); see also Frequently Asked Questions: 2020 Presidential
Campaign, U.S. SECRET SERV., https://www.secretservice.gov/about/faqs [https://perma.cc/
WDD2-FY56] (explaining in further detail how the Secret Service selects presidential and vicepresidential candidates for protection).
216. See generally, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., The Incumbency
Advantage in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942–2000, 1 ELECTION
L.J. 315 (2002) (providing a comprehensive overview of the incumbency advantage in state and
federal elections).
217. Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563, 569
(1999).
218. Admittedly, a valid counterargument to this suggestion is that placing weight on a
candidate’s incumbency status may unfairly subject incumbent candidates to more claims than
challengers. While this is a possibility, this framework specifically does not designate exactly how
much weight to apply to each factor, including incumbency status. Therefore, courts applying this
framework will need to grapple with this question of fairness when deciding how heavily to weigh
a candidate’s incumbency status against them.
219. See supra Part II.C.
220. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 303 (2001).
221. For example, in 2011, President Barack Obama authorized several senior West Wing
officials to communicate directly with his 2012 reelection campaign’s Chicago office and the
Democratic National Committee. Glenn Thrush & Josh Gerstein, Campaigning from the White
House, POLITICO (July 22, 2011, 4:32 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2011/07/campaigningfrom-the-white-house-059631 [https://perma.cc/Y4QF-JAA5].
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employees put in place by legislation such as the Hatch Act.222
However, the line between an incumbent acting in her official capacity
as a state actor and an incumbent acting in her personal capacity as a
political candidate and potential state actor is blurry at best.223 For
instance, President Trump’s 2020 reelection campaign faced
accusations of Hatch Act violations when the president “deliver[ed] his
acceptance speech to the Republican National Convention from the
South Lawn of the White House” after receiving the party’s
nomination as its candidate for the 2020 presidential election.224 This
separation of personal and official realms may work for lower-level
employees who have the benefit of anonymity among the general
public. But this separation is far less effective when the state official is
one the public recognizes in both her personal and official capacities
and who seeks to benefit from that publicity as a candidate. One cannot
so easily separate the state from the incumbent, whether the incumbent
is running for reelection or campaigning on behalf of someone else.225
To summarize, all of these factors—regulation, financing, other
special benefits, and incumbency status—support a conclusion that
political candidates and their campaigns are state actors in certain
circumstances. Hearkening back to Justice Clark’s concurrence in
Terry, political candidates are an essential “part of the machinery for
choosing officials,” as they themselves are the choices among which the

222. Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–7326 (2018). Notably, the Hatch Act does not apply to the
president or vice president. Id. § 7322(1). For a full summary of permissible and prohibited
political activities under the Hatch Act, see CYNTHIA BROWN & JACK MASKELL, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R44469, HATCH ACT RESTRICTIONS ON FEDERAL EMPLOYEES’ POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 11–12 (2016).
223. This absurdity is depicted humorously in an episode of the television show Parks and
Recreation. In the episode, the main character, Leslie Knope, who is deputy director of her city’s
parks and recreation department, is also running for the position of city councilwoman. While in
her office at City Hall, she is approached by her campaign manager to approve a design for a new
campaign poster. After calling her manager a “beautiful rule-breaking moth,” Knope proceeds to
walk through City Hall to an exterior door, takes one step outside, looks at the poster and says,
“Yes,” before returning immediately to work. Parks and Recreation: Sweet Sixteen (NBC
television broadcast Feb. 23, 2012).
224. Zach Montague, What Is the Hatch Act? Is Trump Violating It at the R.N.C.?, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 26, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3lkPYIx [https://perma.cc/S45L-LQZ9].
225. See, e.g., Alexander Burns & Gardiner Harris, Big Names Campaigning for Hillary
Clinton Underscore Donald Trump’s Isolation, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2016), https://nyti.ms/
2emgHRf [https://perma.cc/QB8L-PP8U] (noting that President Obama, Vice President Joe
Biden, and Senator Bernie Sanders campaigned for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential
election).
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electorate must pick.226 Because the electorate is limited to choosing
only from the candidates who run, the candidates are the exclusive
choices for public office and they ought to “take[] on those attributes
of government which draw the Constitution’s safeguards into play.”227
From a policy perspective, individuals who are campaigning to earn a
position as a state actor should have to demonstrate their willingness
and ability to abide by the constitutional restraints that would be
imposed upon them if they were to win the election. It seems illogical
that one could disregard the Constitution in pursuit of a position whose
oath is to defend it.
B. Implications of State Actor Classification on Political Candidates
Though this Note focuses specifically on the threshold
requirement of state action, this would be fruitless if the classification
of political candidates as state actors lacked tangible implications.
Without attempting to describe the full set of scenarios in which
political candidates could be liable for constitutional violations if they
were to be classified as state actors, one could hypothesize that the
majority of these violations would occur in the context of equal
protection and First Amendment rights.
First, the Court is more apt to find state action when equal
protection with regard to race is at stake.228 With tactics such as racial
priming229 seemingly on the rise in political campaigns,230 various

226. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 481 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944)).
227. Id. at 484.
228. See supra Part III.A (discussing the white primary cases).
229. See Michael Tesler, Racial Priming with Implicit and Explicit Messages, OXFORD RSCH.
ENCYC. 3 (May 2017), https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.00
01/acrefore-9780190228637-e-49?print=pdf [https://perma.cc/42DE-ALCX] (“Racial priming is
typically defined as the increased impact of racial attitudes on evaluations of relevant political
candidates or policies.”). See generally Nicholas A. Valentino, Vincent L. Hutchings & Ismail K.
White, Cues that Matter: How Political Ads Prime Racial Attitudes During Campaigns, 96 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 75 (2002) (providing an overview of racial priming in political campaigns).
230. See, e.g., Zack Budryk, Castro: Trump ‘Thinks He’s Going to Win in 2020’ Through
‘Racial Priming,’ HILL (July 28, 2019, 11:36 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talkshows/455060-castro-trump-thinks-hes-going-to-win-in-2020-through-racial [https://perma.cc/
93V7-RE6R] (noting that a Democratic presidential candidate had described Trump’s “attacks”
on a Black congressman as being “part of a broader ‘racial priming’ strategy to shore up the
president’s re-election support”); Sarah McCammon, From Debate Stage, Trump Declines To
Denounce White Supremacy, NPR (Sept. 30, 2020, 12:37 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/30/
918483794/from-debate-stage-trump-declines-to-denounce-white-supremacy [https://perma.cc/
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constitutional tort claims could imaginably be brought against political
candidates and their campaigns for violations of equal protection.
Second, given the nature of elections and campaigning, violations
of the right to free speech may also make courts more open to a finding
of state action. This would align with the Court’s own comments on the
First Amendment’s importance to the maintenance of democracy—
namely, that the First Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
office.”231 For instance, if political candidates were state actors, then
protestors removed from campaign rallies could seek redress for the
violation of their First Amendment rights.232 Additionally, beyond the
protestor examples, political candidates could also be liable for the
online censorship of political speech through social media. For
example, the Second Circuit recently upheld a decision holding that
Trump
engaged
in
“‘unconstitutional
viewpoint
discrimination’ . . . when he blocked certain Twitter users.”233 If a
political candidate engaged in similar behavior, a court may find her
liable as a state actor using the framework this Note proposes.

3TFC-N8JQ] (“President Trump’s hesitation, once again, to denounce white supremacy during
Tuesday’s presidential debate is drawing quick condemnation from anti-racism activists . . . .”).
231. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,
401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“The right of
citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition
to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”).
232. This Note does not discuss the complexities of First Amendment free speech and protest
doctrine. However, to address the likely counterargument that political candidates must retain
the right to control their message in order to effectively campaign, one must acknowledge that
not all removal of protestors from campaign rallies would be a constitutional violation. For
instance, at a Hillary Clinton rally in Atlanta, Georgia, in 2015, protestors from the Black Lives
Matter movement were removed from the rally after loudly chanting and waving signs for almost
thirty minutes despite repeated requests to quiet down. Dan Merica, Hillary Clinton Protested by
Black Lives Matter, CNN (Oct. 31, 2015, 10:20 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/30/politics/
hillary-clinton-black-lives-matter [https://perma.cc/K2RX-GVXM]. In situations such as this,
state law provides for criminal penalties for the unlawful disturbance of assemblies and
disturbance of the peace if certain levels of interruption are reached. Eugene Volokh, Is It a Crime
To Heckle at a Campaign Rally?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 14, 2016, 5:34 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/03/14/is-it-a-crime-to-heckleat-a-campaign-rally [https://perma.cc/U42U-U7AX]. Thus, candidates still retain the ability to
communicate their message, and peaceful protestors retain their right to free speech.
233. Vanessa Romo, U.S. Appeals Court Rules Trump Violated 1st Amendment by Blocking
Twitter Followers, NPR (July 9, 2019, 3:38 PM) (quoting Knight First Amendment Inst. at
Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 236 (2d Cir. 2019)), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/09/
739906562/u-s-appeals-court-rules-trump-violated-first-amendment-by-blocking-twitter-follo
[https://perma.cc/65AS-LQQQ].

SMITH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2/23/2021 9:08 PM

2021 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL 1507
Along the same rationale, infringements of the freedom of the
press by political candidates may also warrant a finding of state action.
For instance, on December 2, 2019, the Trump reelection campaign
announced that it would “no longer credential Bloomberg News
reporters to cover its events,” accusing the news organization of bias in
its coverage of the campaign.234 This example illustrates the fourth
factor discussed in the previous section—the otherwise illogical
distinction between incumbent candidates acting in their personal
versus official capacity. If Trump were to refuse access to a news
organization in his capacity as a state actor, it would clearly trigger
constitutional concerns.235 This supports a conclusion that the same
activity done in his capacity as a candidate should also be subject to
constitutional scrutiny.236
CONCLUSION
As modern politics become increasingly candidate centric and
individual campaigns play a more integral part in the election process,
the natural next step is to extend the logic of the white primary cases
to candidates and campaigns to find that political actors are sometimes
state actors. As courts navigate this uncharted territory, the Court’s
many formulations of the state action doctrine can be synthesized into
a new framework for this context, which would include consideration
of factors like regulation, funding, benefits, and incumbency status.
Though political candidates are not categorically state actors, those

234. Alex Wayne, Trump Campaign Says It Will Shut Out Bloomberg News from Events,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 2, 2019, 6:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-02/trumpcampaign-says-it-will-shut-out-bloomberg-news-from-events [https://perma.cc/FYT6-7VVT].
235. See, e.g., Paul Farhi, Judge Hands CNN a Victory in Its Bid To Restore Jim Acosta’s White
House Press Pass, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2018, 4:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
lifestyle/style/judge-hands-cnn-victory-in-its-bid-to-restore-jim-acostas-white-house-press-pass/
2018/11/16/8bedd08a-e920-11e8-a939-9469f1166f9d_story.html [https://perma.cc/9KC8-XFPC]
(reporting that after the Trump administration revoked the White House press pass of a CNN
reporter, a federal judge ordered the White House to temporarily restore the credentials, citing
primarily Fifth Amendment due process concerns, though not ruling out possible First
Amendment implications as well).
236. Note that if it was instead a challenger refusing access to a news organization, it may be
trickier to find state action using the proposed framework, though certainly not impossible.
Factual analysis of factors such as regulation, funding, and other benefits would still be required.
Additionally, for a challenger candidate, it may still be worth considering whether there is much
overlap between campaign officials and other state officials. Finally, a plaintiff could always put
forth a policy argument stemming from the white primary cases—that a candidate who is one of
the exclusive choices for public office and an essential part of the election machinery should be
expected to comply with the Constitution that she hopes to one day defend.
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campaigning for positions of power ought to demonstrate that they are
prepared to comply with the constitutional constraints that will be
imposed upon them if they win. In a world where the line between
private and public is often blurry, and political actors seem to dance on
that line, a new framework is necessary to think about when the actions
of political candidates and their campaigns may be fairly attributable
to the state.

